LibraryConsensus2015Design paperCorpus record
Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer
Verifier's dilemma. Loi Luu, Jason Teutsch, Raghav Kulkarni and Prateek Saxena.
If checking a block is expensive and the chance it is invalid is small, the equilibrium is not to check. The paper names that gap the verifier's dilemma.
A reading of the public document. Not a copy of it, and not a claim about a later network that reused the name.
A chain that makes block validation arbitrarily expensive has to say who is paid to do it.
The five-minute read
The defect
A rational miner may skip verifying a heavy block and mine on top of it anyway, because verification delays the next puzzle.
The rule
If checking a block is expensive and the chance it is invalid is small, the equilibrium is not to check. The paper names that gap the verifier's dilemma.
How it is put together
Mining reward and verification cost are different clocks. An invalid block that nobody checks can still be extended. The dilemma is about incentives, not about a broken signature scheme.
Where the claim stops
The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.
One action, walked through
- A miner receives a block.
- They estimate the cost of executing it against the chance it is invalid.
- If they mine immediately, their block is wasted only when the parent was bad and someone else noticed.
- What does it cost to check a block before mining on it?
The argument, unpacked
Why it is still on the desk
A chain that makes block validation arbitrarily expensive has to say who is paid to do it.
After the text
Stateless clients, fraud proofs and danksharding all answer a version of this dilemma. The 2015 paper is the question.
What has to be true
- The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.
- It does not say miners never verify.
- It is not a proof that proof of work has failed.
What happened after the paper
Stateless clients, fraud proofs and danksharding all answer a version of this dilemma. The 2015 paper is the question.
What to check before you use the idea
- What does it cost to check a block before mining on it?
- What happens to a miner who extends an invalid parent?
- Is there a separate reward for verification?
Terms
- Verifier's dilemma
- The incentive to skip a check that everyone else might also skip.
- Consensus computer
- A chain that agrees on the result of a program, not only on a list of payments.
The problem the paper names
A rational miner may skip verifying a heavy block and mine on top of it anyway, because verification delays the next puzzle.
What the design proposes
- Mining reward and verification cost are different clocks.
- An invalid block that nobody checks can still be extended.
- The dilemma is about incentives, not about a broken signature scheme.
How the mechanism is specified
- A miner receives a block.
- They estimate the cost of executing it against the chance it is invalid.
- If they mine immediately, their block is wasted only when the parent was bad and someone else noticed.
What this page does not treat as proven
- The paper is about Ethereum-style execution in 2015, not a current gas schedule.
- It does not say miners never verify.
- It is not a proof that proof of work has failed.
Why a venture studio still reads it
A chain that makes block validation arbitrarily expensive has to say who is paid to do it.
This is Blockchain Lab's reading of a public design paper. It is not the paper, not a copy of it, and not an offer of tokens, equity, custody or a partnership. Later network behaviour can diverge from the text. Nothing here is investment, legal or technical advice.
Research status: Design paper. Last reviewed: 1 October 2026. This is a reading of a public paper, not investment, legal or security advice.