Compare
Four documents, the same five questions.
No throughput league table and no yield. The cells are what this library is willing to say about the text.
| Question | Transaction Fee Mechanism Design |
|---|---|
| What the text proposes | A mechanism-design reading of blockchain fees. Roughgarden separates what users pay, what miners keep, and what gets burned, and asks which combinations are incentive-compatible for myopic miners. EIP-1559 is the running example, not a price forecast. |
| Who may write | Tim Roughgarden |
| What is settled | A transaction fee mechanism specifies an allocation rule, a payment rule, and a burning rule. |
| Load-bearing assumption | Myopic means the miner is not playing a long game across blocks. A builder with a private order flow is a harder agent than the model. |
| What this library says afterwards | The paper does not set a fee you should pay, and it does not value a token. |
| Rights | Official external source only |