Compare
Four documents, the same five questions.
No throughput league table and no yield. The cells are what this library is willing to say about the text.
| Question | Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity |
|---|---|
| What the text proposes | The STARK paper: proofs of computational integrity that are succinct, do not need a trusted setup, and are argued to resist quantum attackers on the underlying hashes. StarkWare's later systems, including StarkEx and Starknet, are built on this proof system. They are not identical to it. |
| Who may write | Eli Ben-Sasson, Iddo Bentov, Yinon Horesh, Michael Riabzev |
| What is settled | An algebraic intermediate representation of a computation is proved by an interactive oracle proof, then made non-interactive. |
| Load-bearing assumption | This paper is not the Starknet documentation, the Cairo language spec, or a token paper. |
| What this library says afterwards | Transparent does not mean trustless in the casual sense. Verifiers still trust the hash and the circuit. |
| Rights | Official external source only |
